This paper provides an approach to the formal design of distributed, fault-tolerant processes, using the language of CCS and the theory of bisimulations. The novel feature of the method is the language by which hypotheses about faults can be speci ed and also combined. The development of a fault-tolerant process, under a fault hypothesis, makes use of the structure of this hypothesis. This allows to rst design a process which does not tolerate any faults and then to stepwise transform this process to tolerate an increasing variety of faults. We illustrate this approach designing a protocol which ensures a reliable transmission for weak assumptions about the faults of the underlying medium.
INTRODUCTION
It is widely believed that a retrospective proof of correctness, for programs of realistic size, is infeasible in practice. Much e ort is thus spent to ensure that proof systems support the stepwise development of programs, allowing to reason about them compositionally: a program is correct if only its components can be proven correct. The resulting program is then correct by construction. However, the absence of (software) design faults does not guarantee that the program will behave properly in practice. There is a class of faults that is not due to the wrong design decisions but to the malfunction of hardware components upon which the program relies. Such faults are often due to the physical phenomena and only occur under speci c environmental conditions e.g. electromagnetic perturbation. Because they do not exist before a system is put into practice, they cannot be removed beforehand but have to be tolerated. Clearly, it is not possible to tolerate arbitrary faults. Deciding which faults are anticipated (and thus should be tolerated) and which are not (such faults are catastrophical) is the role of the fault hypothesis. The task is then to design a program which behaves properly in the presence of the anticipated hardware faults. A feasible approach to this task is to separate concerns about the correctness of the program in the absence of faults (the functional correctness) and in the presence of the anticipated faults (fault-tolerance). This can be done in two stages: 1: Designing a program which is correct but fault-intolerant. 2: Transforming this program into the one which is correct and fault-tolerant. However, while the standard techniques (e.g. the stepwise development) can be used to support the rst development stage, the author is not aware of any technique to handle complexity of the second stage. This complexity stems from the fact that the more faults are anticipated, the more di cult is the task to ensure that all these faults are tolerated. The lack of the appropriate support can be seen as a major obstacle in the formal development of highly-reliable, fault-tolerant systems.
This paper presents a development method for concurrent processes, using the language of CCS 1], which attempts to ll this gap. The idea is to use a language where hypotheses about faults can be speci ed and also combined. The development of a fault-tolerant process, under a given fault hypothesis, makes use of the structure of this hypothesis. This allows to rst design a process which does not tolerate any faults and then to stepwise transform this process to tolerate an increasing variety of faults.
We use the standard semantic model for concurrent process description languages, the labelled transition system (P; A; ) ) where P is the set of processes, A is the set of actions and ) P A P is the labelled transition relation. In order to verify correctness in the presence of the speci ed faults, we need to represent the e ect of these faults on the behaviour of processes. We do this rst semantically, providing transition relation ) P A P for -a ected processes Q, and then syntactically, applying process transformation T (Q; ) 2, 3]. We show that both methods coincide, i.e. that the semantics of Q in the -a ected environment (performing transitions ) ) is`the same'
as the semantics of the transformed process T (Q; ) in the fault-free environment (performing transitions ) ). This allows to reason about fault-tolerance using the standard veri cation techniques e.g. applying bisimulation equivalence 1, 4]:
Q is the -tolerant implementation of P, according , i P T (Q; ).
(1)
For multiple faults and we provide transition relation )
; and show that it coincides with transition relation ) for the combined fault . The same is the case when we compare transformations T (T (Q; ); ) and T (Q; ). As a result, if P T (Q; ) then Q is an implementation of P which tolerates (simultaneous) faults and . This enables to develop such Q in two steps:
where R 1 and R 2 are fault-tolerant transformations which may employ various techniques to detect (e.g. coding of data), con ne (e.g. atomic actions) and recover (e.g. backward and forward recovery) from erroneous states of P. Thus P is transformed to tolerate in stages, one for each sub-hypothesis and . The rest of this paper is as follows. Both speci cation languages, of processes and of faults are de ned in Sections 2 and 3. The veri cation theory, based on bisimulations and transformations of processes is introduced in Section 4. In Section 5 we present the development method for fault-tolerance by the stepwise transformations of processes and exemplify this method designing a protocol which ensures a reliable transmission for weak assumptions about the faults of the underlying medium. Finally, in Section 6, we draw some conclusions and comment on the directions for future work.
SPECIFICATION: PROCESSES
In this section we present the language for describing concurrent processes. The language is a version of CCS which is slightly modi ed for our purposes. It is given the structured operational semantics 5] in terms of the labelled transition relation ) . We proceed describing rst nite then recursive and nally value-passing processes.
Finite Processes
The language E of nite processes is based on a set A of actions. We have 2 A where is internal and represents the outcome of a joint activity (interaction) between two processes. The set L = def A f g is partitioned between actions a and their complements a where the function is bijective and such that a = a. We extend into A by allowing = . Let 2 A, L L and f : A ! A where f( ) = , f(a) 6 = and f(a) = f(a). E, ranged over by E, is de ned by the grammar: Finally, E f] behaves like E with all actions a renamed into f(a).
The formal semantics of E 2 E is de ned by induction on the structure of E, in terms of the labelled transition relation ) E A E. If (E; ; E 0 ) 2 ) then we write E ) E 0 and say that E performs and evolves into E 0 (we also use E ) s E 0 for s 2 A ).
Following 1], ) is de ned as the least set which satis es all inference rules in Figure 1 . We use one derived operator, E a F, where E and F proceed in parallel with actions out of E and in of F`joined' and restricted (mid is not used by E or F): E a F = def (E mid=out]jF mid=in])nfmidg (4) 
Recursion
It is most common to model hardware devices by cyclic, possibly nonterminating processes. In order to specify such processes consider a set X of process identi ers and, with slight abuse of notation, a new grammar for E which extends (3) by X 2 X: E ::= : : : j X
We call such E a process expression and use X(E) X for the set of identi ers occurring in E. We also use EfY=Xg for process expression E where all identi ers X are replaced by Y . The semantics of E is well-de ned by ) (Figure 1 Figure 2 , by induction on the structure of .
dom( ])
= def ; = E such that the predicate p holds.
A process P 2 P is nally the pair hE; i of the process expression E and the closed declaration for all identi ers of E: X(E) dom( ). The semantics of hE; i is de ned, with slight abuse of notation, by transition relation ) P A P which is the least set which satis es all inference rules in Figure 3 . It is easy to see that persists through the transitions of hE; i i.e. if hE; i ) P 0 then there exists E 0 2 E such that P 0 hE 0 ; i ( is the syntactic identity). in Figure 1 h ] ](X); i ) hE; i hX; i ) hE; i for X 2 dom( ) Figure 3 . Operational semantics of processes P.
Example 1 Consider n 2 N f1g and let R n be a process which performs actions a and b; the rst at any time; the second no more than n times in a row (R 0 can never perform b and R 1 can perform b at any time). We have:
R n = def hX 0 ; ri where
Operators (3) will be also used to combine processes, under syntactic restriction that processes involved have disjoint sets of identi ers. If dom( ) \ dom(r) = ; then: :hE; i = def h :E; i hE; inL = def hE nL; i hE; i f] = def hE f]; i hE; i + hF; ri = def hE + F; ri hE; i j hF; ri = def hE j F; ri (7) 2.3. Value-Passing
In the language de ned so far, processes interact by synchronising on complementary actions a and a. There is no directionality or value which passes between them. In practice however, we may nd it convenient to use a value-passing language for the set V of values (we assume, for simplicity, that V is nite).
To this end we introduce value constants, value variables x, value and boolean expressions e and p built using constants, variables and any function symbols we need. These include " as the empty sequence; ]s as the length of the sequence s; s 0 , its rst element; s 0 , all but the rst element; s : x, the sequence s with x appended. We also introduce parameters into process identi ers: X(e1; ::; en) for X of arity n. 
SPECIFICATION: FAULTS
We treat transition relation ) as the semantics of processes in the idealised, faultfree environment. The primary e ect of faults however is that processes no longer behave according to ) . We use ) to model the fault-a ected semantics and assume that ) ) . In the rst part of this section we show how to specify such relations. The idea is to use process identi ers as`states' which can be potentially a ected by faults.
Each process hE; i provides its own declaration for process identi ers. In contrast to this,`normal' declaration, we specify faults by an alternative,`faulty' declaration .
For certain faults, fault-tolerance cannot be ensured in full. In these circumstances, we may be satis ed with its conditional version, for certain assumptions about the quantity of faults. Even when the`full' fault-tolerance is (in theory) possible, we may choose its conditional version to rst design a process for restricted assumptions about faults and then to stepwise transform this process to ensure fault-tolerance for more relaxed assumptions. For these reasons, it is important that in addition to possible`faulty' transitions ) = def ) ) , we can also specify assumptions about the quantity of such transitions. Such assumptions are introduced in the second part of this section.
Qualitative Assumptions
In order to specify faults we will use declarations D. As de ned in Figure 3 is not assumed to be closed. Instead, we assume that all process identi ers in the rightside expressions of are declared in , so that ) does not lead from the well-de ned process to the ill-de ned one: S F2ran( ) X(F) dom( ). We use P for the set of all such hE; i. Given which speci es anticipated faults, we can de ne a new, -a ected semantics of processes, in terms of transition relation ) P A P which is the least set which satis es inference rules in Figure 4 . If (P; ; P 0 ) 2 ) then we write P ) P 0 (we also use P ) s P 0 for s 2 A Observe that each of the three inference rules in Figure 4 determines a set of rules: one for each rule in Figure 1 and one for each process identi er X 2 dom( ) and X 2 dom( ) respectively. It is easy to see that ) ) . We will write: P ) P 0 i P ) P 0 and P 6 ) P Because we are not interested in the particular value of the corrupted or created messages, we represent them all by the same, distinguished message p . An implicit assumption is that corruption and creation can be easily detected (although not easily distinguished). We also assume that when permuted, only one message is delayed. Observe that the induction is well-de ned: the rst rule provides the base, for the empty sequence ", and the second rule decreases the length of the action sequence by one. The family f ) h h 0gh;h 0 2H denotes the semantics of processes P when they are a ected by and under assumption H about the quantity of transitions ) .
VERIFICATION: BISIMULATION AND TRANSFORMATIONS
Fault-tolerance is a crucial property for safety-critical systems. Such a system is said to tolerate anticipated faults when its behaviour is`correct' in an operating environment which contains these faults. As such, fault tolerance depends on the chosen notion of correctness. For verifying correctness we provide the choice of the three relations: trace equivalence, bisimulation equivalence and bisimulation preorder. They give rise to different notions of fault-tolerance which is veri ed using transformations T ( ; ) to model e ects of faults on the semantics of processes. Transformations are also used to verify conditional fault-tolerance, under assumption H about the quantity of faults.
Functional Correctness
Consider the`weak' transition relation =) P (L f"g) P where transitions ) are ignored and let range over L f"g. We de ne =) then we write P =) P 0 . We also write P =) s , s 2 L , if there exists P 0 such that P =) s P 0 . Trace equivalence, denoted 1 , identi es a process with all sequences of (observable) actions that it can perform, like in the standard automata theory:
Examples are processes P, Q, R and S in Figure 6 which can all perform the same sequences of actions a and b. Thus P 1 Q 1 R 1 S. Trace equivalence however admits a linear-time approach to process executions, ignoring at which execution stages which choices are made. For example P 1 Q but action b is always possible for P and not always for Q. As a result, in the environment which continually demands b, P will always meet this demand and Q will sometimes deadlock. Thus 1 is insensitive to deadlock. This is not the case for bisimulation equivalence, 1, 4], which is de ned in terms of relations B such that if (P; Q) 2 B then for all 2 L f"g: whenever P =) P 0 then 9 Q 0 Q =) Q 0^( P 0 ; Q 0 ) 2 B whenever Q =) Q 0 then 9 P 0 P =) P 0^( P 0 ; Q 0 ) 2 B
Such B is called a bisimulation and we have P Q i there exists a bisimulation B which contains the pair (P; Q). For processes in Figure 6 we have P 6 Q because . Also P R S because f(P; R); (P 0 ; R 0 ); (P 0 ; R 00 )g and f(P; S); (P 0 ; S 0 ); (P 0 ; S 00 )g are bisimulations. However, only S can engage (after a or b) in the in nite sequence of actions so bisimulation equivalence is insensitive to divergence.
The closest to , divergence-sensitive relation is bisimulation preorder, v 6, 7] . Informally, P v Q i P and Q are bisimulation equivalent, except perhaps when P diverges, and Q diverges no more than P does. Thus Q is at least as`good' as P: whenever P converges, Q must converge as well, however if P diverges then Q need not diverge. Consider the predicate # P where if P 2 # then we write P # and say that the process P converges. Based on #, we de ne P + if there is no process P 0 such that P =) P 0 and Figure 6 . Transition diagrams of P, Q, R and S.
which performs action inde nitely:
P + " i P # and whenever P ) P 0 then P 0 + " P + a i P + " and whenever P =) a P 0 then P 0 + " (11) Bisimulation preorder v is de ned in terms of relations B, called partial bisimulations, such that if (P; Q) 2 B then: whenever P =) P 0 then 9 Q 0 Q =) Q 0^( P 0 ; Q 0 ) 2 B whenever P + then Q + î f Q =) Q 0 then 9 P 0 P =) P 0^( P 0 ; Q 0 ) 2 B (12) We have P v Q i (P; Q) 2 B for some partial bisimulation B. For processes in Figure  6 we have P v R because f(P; R); (P 0 ; R 0 ); (P 0 ; R 00 )g is a partial bisimulation and P 6 v S because P + a and S 6 + a.
Fault-Tolerance
Suppose that denotes any one of relations 1 , or v, and consider the high-level process P. Such P determines the set of admissible implementations Q, P Q, where semantics of both P and Q is de ned by transition relation ) . The situation however is di erent if we want to ensure that Q is a fault-tolerant implementation of P, according to and the speci cation of faults. Informally, such Q should behave`properly' in any environment where faults are speci ed by . Such a -a ected behaviour of Q is then de ned by transition relation ) , in contrast to P which still behaves according to ) . This raises the problem of comparing two processes which behaviour is de ned by di erent transition relations ) and ) . In order to solve this problem consider the following transformation T of processes: T (hE; i; ) = def hE; i (13) It is easy to show that such T provides an equivalent to ) , syntactic method of representing e ect of faults on the behaviour of processes, i.e. we can show that:
Proposition 2 The same approach can be used to verify that Q tolerates multiple faults, say faults speci ed by and . Applying Proposition 1 which shows that the joint e ect of and , )
; , is the same as the e ect of the combined fault , ) , and Proposition 2 which allows to express ) in terms of ) and T ( ; ), it is enough to prove that:
4.3. Conditional Fault-Tolerance Suppose now that we want to verify hE; i in the presence of faulty transitions ) and under assumption H f0; 1g about admissible transition type histories. To this end, like before, we will use process transformations. The idea is to use a family fX h g h2H of the process identi ers, for each identi er X of or . Thus E h is obtained from E by replacing all process identi ers X 2 X(E) by X h ; H is obtained from by replacing each declaration X b = F by the family of declarations X h b = FfY h:0 =Y j Y 2 X(F)g for all h 2 H, and H is similar like H but only taking h 2 H such that h : 1 2 H. Finally, we de ne f T(hE; i; ; H) as f T " (hE; i; ; H).
Recall that the e ect of on the semantics of P , under assumption H about the quantity of transitions ) , is de ned by the family f ) h h 0g h;h 0 2H of transition relations.
There are two problems to obtain the same e ect using transformations:
1. Consider X 2 dom( ) \ dom( ) and transition hX; i ) hE; i which can be either inferred from h ] ](X); i ) hE; i or from h ] ](X); i ) hE; i. The problem appears when hX; i ) hE; i can be inferred from both of them. Then it is regarded as`normal' by ) h h 0 but either as`normal' or`faulty' by f T h ( ; ; H).
If no such E and exists then we say that has the proper e ect on . Example 7 Consider n; m > 0 and the task to ensure a reliable communication (speci ed by Buf m+n+2 and according to v) over a medium of capacity m which permutes messages.
To this end we will use two processes: the sender Sp n and the receiver Rp n . In order to determine the proper transmission order, messages will be send by Sp n with their sequence numbers modulo n. The value of n determines the number of parallel components St i of Rp n (i = 0; : : : ; n 1), each one used to store a message with the sequence value i, 
DEVELOPMENT: STEPWISE TRANSFORMATIONS
So far we were only concerned with how to verify that given a high-level process P, a fault hypothesis and a low-level, -a ected process Q, Q is an implementation of P (according to some ) which tolerates (perhaps under a certain assumption H about its quantity). The problem of how to design such Q has been completely ignored. This problem is the topic of the current section.
In most cases, Q can be obtained by the transformation R(P) of P. For example we have: R(Buf m ) = Buf m 1 a Re to tolerate e according to (Example 6, m > 1) and R(Buf m ) = Sp n a Buf m n 2 a Rp n to tolerate p according to v (Example 7, m > n+2).
Thus, when no assumption about the quantity of faults is made, our problem is to nd a transformation R such that: P T (R(P); ) (18) To this end, R(P) will employ various techniques to detect, con ne and to recover from erroneous states of P, by introducing some additional, recovery processes. Our task is easier when the recovery processes are assumed not to be a ected by , i.e. when they do not share any process identi ers with (like Re, Sp n and Rp n ). It this case, T (R(P); ) is identical with R(T (P; )) and it is enough to prove that: P R(T (P; )) (19) For example, in order to verify Buf m+1 T (Buf m a Re; e ), it is enough to prove that Buf m+1 T (Buf m ; e ) a Re. It is out of scope of this paper to investigate any particular technique to design such R(P). Instead, when = 1 n , we would like to propose that R(P) is obtained from P by the sequence of transformations, one for each component i of . Then, we can expect that the task to tolerate each i is easier than the task to tolerate them altogether. This suggests the following development process: P 0 T (P 1 ; 1 ) T (P 2 ; 1 2 ) T (P n ; 1 n )
where P 0 P and P i R i (P i 1 ) for i = 1 : : : n. Such P i aims to tolerate i in the presence of faults speci ed by 1 ; : : : ; i 1 and in general depends on the recovery processes used in the earlier stages of the design. The nal transformation R(P) = R n (: : : R 1 (P) : : : 
This means that P i+1 does not depend on the recovery processes used in the i-th step,
i.e. that both steps are independent. When is preserved by all transformations R i and when none of the recovery processes is a ected by faults then all stages are mutually independent and the nal transformation R(P) = R 1 (: : : R n (P) : : : It is often the case that recovery processes are a ected by faults themselves. Even worse, that they introduce new faults (not speci ed by ), as in case of the sliding window protocol and acknowledgements which are not exchanged by simple synchronisations but using a medium which itself may be faulty. Suppose that speci es`new' faults, introduced by recovery processes of R(P). In this case we have to prove that: P T (R(P); ) (22) So far, we were not concerned with assumptions H about the quantity of faults. However, such assumptions can be used to support the stepwise procedure (20). To this end, we can rst design a process for strong assumptions about the quantity of faults (say H) and then to stepwise transform this process to ensure fault-tolerance for increasingly relaxed assumptions (H 0 where H H 0 ). Such a stepwise procedure will be described elsewhere.
CONCLUSIONS
Currently, there is a number of methods for specifying and proving correctness of faulttolerant systems 3, 9{15]. In this paper, we did not aim to provide yet another formalism. Our purpose was to show how the well-established theory of CCS can be extended to reason about fault-tolerance, with emphasis placed on reasoning under weak assumptions about faults. This extension includes two languages (for specifying processes and faults), veri cation theory based on transformations of processes (and exempli ed using bisimulations and partial bisimulations) and the development approach where multiple faults are proposed to be tolerated incrementally, by stepwise transformations.
We plan to continue this work in all three aspects: speci cation, veri cation and ( rst of all) development of fault-tolerant processes. When the last is concerned, we plan to provide some constructive proof rules for certain, well-known techniques for faulttolerance, e.g. backward recovery and modular redundancy. Also, to utilise assumptions about the quantity of faults for the stepwise design of fault-tolerant processes.
